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FAMILY TIES AND UNEMPLOYMENT
Antonia Díaz and MaDolores Guilló
A B S T R A C T
In this paper we build a model economy in which the prevailing family structure arises
endogenously as a response to labor market conditions. In this model the members of
the household (parents and young adults) either work in the market, search for a job,
or produce a household good. Parents feel altruistically towards their o¤spring. Our
…rst …nding is that search e¤orts of the unemployed members of the family are strategic
substitutes. The second one is that, everything else equal, young adults leave their parents’
house if they receive a su¢ciently high wage; otherwise, they stay. In the latter case, both
young adult’s and spouse’s search e¤orts are lower, since the spouse’s opportunity cost
of working in the market is greater when the employed young adult stays at home. As a
result, both youth’s and female spouse’s unemployment rates are higher. This result is in
line with the evidence we have for Spain.
KEYWORDS: Family Ties; Household Good; Unemployment.
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1 Introduction
The main feature of the prevailing family structure in Spain is that, increasingly over the
last years, young adults tend to stay at their parents’ house. For instance, the fraction of
young men aged between 25 and 29 that stay in the parental house has increased from
53.2 percent to 65.8 percent during the period 1986-94, and this fraction for young women
has increased from 35.3 percent to 47.6 percent over the same period. This behavior
contrasts with that of other European countries (see Table 1),1and it is obviously related
to unemployment. The average unemployment rate among young people almost doubles
the average rate in Spain (see Table 2) and those that live in multi-person households
constitute about the 60 percent of total unemployment (see Table 3). Nevertheless, a
signi…cant fraction of young people staying at their parents’ home is neither unemployed
nor studying: 45.73 percent of males and 31.51 percent of females who stay with their
parents are working, and 52.51 and 54 percent of those males and females, respectively,
who are working are living with their parents (see Table 4).
Cantó-Sánchez and Mercader-Prats (1999) argue that instability in the job place and
the cost of housing are key to understand why young Spaniards stay with their parents.
They show that more than 80 percent of school leavers hold a temporary job in 1996
and that the majority of them could not …nd a permanent job (see Table 5), and that
housing costs have increased more than 14 percent points than the mean wage in the last
years. Moreover, according with the Panel Europeo de Hogares (PHOGUE), in 1994 the
average wage of those that stay at their parents’ home is around 85.5 percent of the wage
perceived by those who live by themselves and that this percentage declines with the level
of education (see Table 6). Martínez-Granado and Ruiz-Castillo (1998) study the main
factors that make youths to leave the parental house and those households’ characteristics
that a¤ect their decision. They …nd that the probability of leaving is inversely related
to housing costs and that it depends mainly on the probability of …nding a job, which is
related to the level of education and age and inversely related to the unemployment rate.
With respect to households’ carachteristics, they …nd that the higher the educational
attainment of parents, the higher the probability of having young people studying at
home, but if both parents have a college degree, young individuals are more likely to
leave. Finally, they obtain that the probability of staying appears to be positively related
to the mother being not working. Thus, according with the above evidence, we can
conclude that bad labor market conditions make young people to stay at their parents’
home and that, apparently, the probability of staying is larger in traditional households
where the mother does not work in the market.
In a di¤erent line of research, Ahn and Ugidos (1996), Cantó-Sánchez (1997) and
Cebrián and Jimeno (1998) focus on how the prevailing family structure and family char-
acteristics a¤ect the individuals’ performance in the labor market. Ahn and Ugidos (1996)
…nd that unemployed fathers or mothers increase greatly the risk of unemployment of their
children and show that this negative e¤ect of parents’ unemployment on children is much
greater for the mother than for the father. Cantó-Sánchez (1997) …nds that children living
1Except for Italy that looks very similar to Spain.
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in households where both parents are working may experience low unemployment rates,
whereas those living in households where the mother is not working, or she is just a dis-
couraged seeker, will experience high unemployment rates. Cebrián and Jimeno (1998)
show that the level of household income a¤ects negatively the mother’s and children’s
probability of becoming employed, and that unemployment mainly a¤ects to secondary
earners within the household: the fraction of households where all active individuals were
unemployed was 8.47 percent in 1998, whereas the average unemployment rate was 18.91
percent at that time. Furthermore, according with EPA (Spanish Labor Force Survey),
the unemployment rates of those individuals cathegorized as female “spouses” and “chil-
dren” are more than twice the unemployment rate of male “heads” (see Table 7). Thus,
this evidence suggests that the average pro…le of an unemployed individual is a¤ected by
the prevailing family structure.
In summary, connecting these two branches of the literature, there seems to be a two-
way interaction between the individuals’ labor market performance and the prevailing
family structure. On the one side, bad labor market conditions a¤ect mainly “female”
spouses and young people; as a consequence, the latter tend to stay at their parents’
home. On the other side, the labor market performance of an individual that lives in
family is a¤ected by her or his family status and by the labor performance of the rest
of the members in the household; in particular, unemployment rates of individuals other
than the head of the household are high. Therefore, to better understand the behavior of
unemployed workers we must explicitly study the structure of the household.
This paper provides a theoretical framework to analyze the individuals’ employment
search decisions within the household. The main novelty of the model we present is that
the type of family structure prevailing in a society arises endogenously as a response to
di¤erent labor market conditions and this, in turn, a¤ects the individuals’ incentives to
look for a job. To our knowledge, there are no previous theoretical works where this issue
is analyzed and so we propose to start with a very simple structure. We build a four-stage
model in which parents feel altruistically towards their children. Individuals either search
for a job and work in the market, or work producing a household good. This good is a
public good inside the household. Young adults can either stay or leave their parents’
home, and if they stay, they must share their labor income with their parents.
Our …rst …nding is that search e¤orts of the unemployed members of the family are
strategic substitutes. This result arises because unemployed individuals receive transfers
from the rest of the family. Hence, the higher the other members’ e¤ort the higher the
expected utility of being unemployed. Second, we …nd that, everything else equal, young
adults leave their parents’ home if they perceive their wage to be su¢ciently high. In
turn, the young adult’ decision of leaving will a¤ect the female spouse’s reservation wage
since her marginal utility of working at home will be larger when children or young adults
stay. As a result, search e¤orts of both the young adult and the spouse are lower than in
the case in which the perceived young’s wage is su¢ciently high.
Finally, we analyze the e¤ect of allowing individuals to choose the number of hours
they work in the market. The results show that allowing for part time work when young
people perceive their wages to be very low, may result in a higher search e¤ort for spouses
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and a lower search e¤ort for young people. Thus, a policy implication of introducing a
‡exible workweek is that it should be accompanied by measures aimed to improve young
adults’ labor prospects.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the environment.
Section 3 analyzes the young adult’s decision of leaving, labor supplies, and their rela-
tionship. Section 4 focuses on the strategic search behavior of unemployed individuals
whithin the household. Section 5 discusses the type of family that arises depending on
the youth’s wage. Section 6 discusses the e¤ects of introducing a ‡exible hours regime.
And Section 7 concludes.
2 The model
Consider a representative family composed by three members: The head, the spouse and
the child, or young adult. The head and the spouse are altruistic towards their o¤spring,
whereas the latter only cares about himself. Agents obtain utility from two kinds of
consumption goods: A market good, denoted as c, and a household good, denoted as
g. The latter is a public good inside the household.2 At some point, the young adult
must decide whether to stay within his parents’ household or to leave, living on his
own. Individuals are endowed with one unit of time and do not value leisure. They can
either engage in household production or in the provision of the market good, if they are
employed. Unemployed individuals search for a job with intensity s ¸ 0 at a utility cost
c(s). Search generates a job o¤er with probability ¼(s); both c(s) and ¼(s) are strictly
increasing in s. Individuals with di¤erent family status command di¤erent wages in the
market. We will …rst assume that the workweek is …xed: Employed individuals work their
entire unit of time in the market. In this case, the household good will be produced by
the unemployed members of the family.3. In section 6 we will review the case in which
the individuals can decide the fraction of their time they devote to market and household
production, respectively, and compare the equilibrium allocation with the one obtained
assuming a …xed workweek. Throughout the paper we will assume that the head of the
family is employed.
Individuals’ preferences on consumption are represented by the following utility func-
tions, where the head is indexed by 1, the spouse by 2, and the young adult by 3:
U3 (c3; g3; s3) = log(c3) + ± log(g3); (1)
2This assumption is meant to capture the fact that the marginal cost of doing the housework for an
additional person is very low; relaxing it will not modify the main results of the model and will complicate
unnecessarily the algebra.
3We are not considering leisure decisons, instead we are …xing (normalizing to one) the time agents
devote to work and make endogenous the allocation of working time between market and home production.
The utility cost of searching can be interpreted as the cost in leisure time unemployed agents have to
bear if they want to become (market) employed.
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Ui (ci; gi; si; U3) = log (ci) + ± log (gi) + ¯U3 (c3; g3) ; i = 1; 2: (2)
Where the parameters ± > 0 and ¯ 2 (0; 1) stand, respectively, for the relative wheight of
the household good in the agents’ utilility and for the parents’ altruism intensity towards
their o¤spring. The production of the household good only requires time. The technology
available to produce g is represented by the function
g (l) = b+ a ¢ l a; b > 0, (3)
where l is the total time household members do not spend working in the market. To
simplify the analysis, we assume that the young adult has productivity zero in household
production. Similar qualitative results as those as we are going to discuss would follow
if this assumption were removed. Since the head is employed and the young adult is
unproductive, the amount of household good is b if the spouse is employed or a+ b if she
is unemployed: Recall that this good is a public good inside the household. Therefore,
the head and the spouse always consume the same amount of g. The young adult will
consume the same amount of the home good as they do if he decides to stay within his
parents’ household, but it can be di¤erent if he decides to live on his own. In that case,
he will consume an amount b.
Timing of the actions
1. Unemployed individuals search for a job without communicating it to the rest of
the family. They search taking as given the other individuals’ employment status,
if employed, or search e¤ort, if unemployed.
2. Individuals receive an o¤er with a probability that is directly related to the level of
their search e¤ort. This o¤er is observed by all family members. Individuals decide
whether to accept or to reject the o¤er and, if the workweek is ‡exible, the fraction
of time they want to work in the market.
3. The young individual decides whether to stay at his parents’ home or to leave.
4. Agents engage in production activities and consumption takes place. The alloca-
tion of consumption across members of the parents’ household is decided using a
exogenously given sharing rule. We discuss this issue in the following subsection.
The model will be solved backwards and so we start by …nding the consumption
allocations that will take place once agents know what fraction of their time endowments
will be allocated into the market, and once the young adult has decided whether to stay
or to leave his parents’ home.
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2.1 Consumption allocations
We follow the e¢ciency approach proposed by Chiappori (1992), Chiappori et al. (1998)
and Blundell et al. (1998). The idea underlying this approach is the following: Spouses
engage in a bargaining process to decide the allocation of aggregate resources. Any al-
location resulting from this process is Pareto e¢cient and, thus, there exists a weighting
factor ¹ belonging to [0; 1] such that the allocation maximizes the objective function
¹ ¢ U1 + (1¡ ¹) ¢ U2 subject to an aggregate budget constraint. The weighting factor
¹ will depend on the individuals’ wages and their employment status. Nevertheless, to
simplify our analysis, we suppose that the bargaining process that determines the sharing
rule of aggregate resources is already given at stage one; therefore, ¹ does not depend on
employment status. We are just assuming that sharing rules determining intra-household
allocations vary more slowly than the employment status of the members of the house-
hold.4 Furthermore, we assume that the young adult has no power in the bargaining
process. In the …nal section we discuss more at length how letting the sharing rule to
vary with employment status would a¤ect the results presented in this paper.
There are two additional features that distinguish our household setting from Chiap-
pori’s (1992) two-agent one-good framework. First, the two members of the collective
decision unit (parents) care about the utility of a third member (young adult) which
has no decision power on the sharing rules imposed within his parents’ household5. Sec-
ond, agents must allocate their time endowments between the production of the (private)
market good and the (public) household good.6
Let wj and hj be, respectively, the wage and the fraction of time agent j spends
working in the market, j = 1; 2; 3:Given the employment status and wages of all household
members, the consumption allocations when the young adult has decided to stay at his
parents’ home are the solution to the following program:
max
c1;c2;c3
f¹U1 + (1¡ ¹)U2g [P ] (4)
s. t. c1 + c2 + c3 · w1 + w2 ¢ h2 + w3 ¢ h3;
c1; c2; c3 > 0; hj 2 f0; 1g , j = 2; 3:
4There are no empirical …ndings backing this assumption. Blundell et al. (1998) estimate labor
supplies and sharing rules for couples where both partners are working or are voluntarily unemployed.
The sharing rules they estimate depends on both partners’ wages and employment status. We cannot
use their results because in our model there does exists involuntary unemployment.
5Assuming egoistic preferences for all agents and de…ning the appropiate weights in the planner‘s
utility function will yield the same results. In any case, the young adult will leave the parents’ home
when some minimum utility is not guaranteed.
6Apps and Rees (1997) extend Chiappori’s (1992) work to take account of household production. In
their framework, sharing rules a¤ect not only the consumption of the market good but also the private
consumption of the household good.
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where ¹ 2 [0; 1] is the weighting factor that determines the exact location of the con-
sumption allocations on the Pareto frontier. The solution to problem [P ] is given by:
cP1 =
¹
1+¯
W; cP2 =
1¡¹
1+¯
W; cP3 =
¯
1+¯
W; W = (w1 + w2h2 + w3h3) : (5)
In case the young adult has decided to leave his parents’ home, the consumption
allocations will be the solution to:
max
c1;c2;T
f¹U1 + (1¡ ¹)U2g [A] (6)
s. t. c1 + c2 + T · w1 + w2h2;
c3 · w3h3 + T;
c1; c2 > 0; T ¸ 0; hj 2 f0; 1g :
where T represents the amount of the market good parents transfer to their o¤spring.
This transfer is a function of wages and employment status,
T = max
½
¯ (w1 + w2h2)¡ w3h3
1 + ¯
; 0
¾
(7a)
Notice that if ¯ (w1 + w2h2) · w3h3 the transfer will be zero.7 If the transfer is positive,
the young consumes the same amount of the market good either living at his parents’
or living on his own. Therefore, the consumption allocations that solve program (A) are
determined by the following rules:
If T = 0; cA1 = ¹ (w1 + w2h2) ; c
A
2 = (1¡ ¹) (w1 + w2h2) ;
and cA3 = w3h3: (8)
If T > 0; cAj = c
P
j , j = 1; 2; 3; (9)
7Parents actually would like to receive a transfer from their child in this case.
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where cPj is the solution to program (P ) given in expression (4).
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Since the home good is a public good inside the household, the consumption of g is not
subject to any sharing rule and so both the head of the family and the spouse will consume
the same amount of it. Recall that this amount does not depend on the young adult’s
staying or leaving the parents’ household. It only depends on the spouse’s employment
status. The young’s staying or living decision will only a¤ect his own consumption level
of the home good. Thus, we can write the production of g as a function of h2 alone:
gPi (h2) = g
A
i (h2) = b+ a (1¡ h2) ´ g (h2) ; i = 1; 2: (10)
gP3 (h2) = g (h2) ; g
A
3 (h2) = b: (11)
Indirect Utility from Consumption Given the employment status of all family mem-
bers and the young’s decision of staying or leaving the parents’ house, the solutions to
the above problems determine the value functions associated to each possible situation.
Let V and V3 stand for the indirect consumption utility functions associated, respectively,
to the parents’ collective unit (wheighted sum of their utilitites) and to the young adult.
Taking into account (5), (8), (9), (10) and (11), we de…ne the following three situations:
1. The young adult stays at his parents’home (P ) :
V (h2; h3;P ) = logm+ (1 + ¯)
"
log
X
j
wjhj + ± log g(h2)
#
; (12)
V3 (h2; h3;P ) = logn+ log
X
j
wjhj + ± log gp(h2); (13)
2. The young adult stays alone (A) and receives a positive transfer (T ).
V (h2; h3;A; T ) = logm+ (1 + ¯) log
X
wjhj + ± log g(h2) + ¯± log b; (14)
V3 (h2; h3;A; T ) = logn+ log
X
j
wjhj + ± log b: (15)
8Notice that the fraction of aggregate labor income that the young adult receives from his parents,
¯=(1+¯), is invariant with respect to their bargaining power, which is captured by the weighting factor ¹.
This implies that ¹ is assumed to be invariant with respect to young’s decision about staying or leaving
his parents’ house.
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3. The young adult, if employed, leaves and stays alone (A) but receives no transfer.
V (h2; h3;A) = log v + log (w1 + w2h2) + ± log g(h2) + ¯V3 (h2; h3;A) (16)
V3 (h2; h3;A) = logw3h3 + ± log b (17)
where m = ¹¹ (1¡ ¹)1¡¹ ¯¯= (1 + ¯)1+¯ ; n = ¯= (1 + ¯) ; and v = ¹¹ (1¡ ¹)1¡¹ :
In the next section, we use these value functions to characterize the young’s decision
of leaving and labor supplies.
3 Labor supplies and the young adult’s decision of
leaving
The head and the spouse constitute a collective decision unit and so they jointly decide how
to allocate their time endowments between household and market activities. In contrast,
we assume that the young adult takes his own decision, but if he becomes employed and
decides to stay at the parental house, he must share his labor income according with his
parents’ sharing rules. If the workweek is …xed and the head, by assumption, is already
employed, the parents’ labor supply decision reduces to accept or to reject a job o¤er
received by the spouse. That is, it reduces to either allocating the spouse’s time entirely
in market production or in home production. We will show that this decision depends
on whether the young adult decides to stay at the parental house or not. On the other
hand, the young adult’s labor supply decision is trivial since his productivity in home
production is zero: given the employment status of his parents, he is better o¤ being
employed than unemployed and so he will always accept a job o¤er.
We limit our analysis to a subset of the parameter space, that ensures meaningful
equilibrium outcomes, characterized by the following assumptions:
Assumption 1.
¡
b
b+a
¢±
>
³
¯
1+¯
´
:
Assumption 2
¡
b
b+a
¢±
> 1=2:
Assumption 1 ensures the existence of a positive young’s wage level above which the
young adult’s utility gain of leaving the parental house without a transfer when the spouse
is unemployed is positive (i.e.: the di¤erence V3 (0; 1;A) ¡ V3 (0; 1;P ) can be positive if
the young’s wage is su¢ciently high). If this assumption is not satis…ed, staying (and
so accepting the sharing rule) is always prefered to leaving. Assumption 2 is a su¢cient
condition for the spouse’s reservation wage being always smaller than the head’s wage,
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and it implies that the marginal productivity of household work is not too large. If this
assumption is not satis…ed, the subset of the parameter space characterized by a head’s
wage (…rst earner’s wage) larger than the spouse’s wage (second earner’s wage) could be
empty.
3.1 Staying or leaving the parents’ house
Expressions (13), (15), and (17) are used to characterize under which conditions the young
adult decides to leave or to stay. If both the young adult and the spouse are unemployed
the former will prefer to stay since his consumption of the market good will be the same
in either situation, but the consumption of the household good is greater when he stays.
If the young adult is unemployed and the spouse is employed, he will be indi¤erent about
leaving since he will consume the same amounts of both goods either in or out of his
parents’ home. In that case, we assume that he stays at his parents’. If he has a job, his
decision will depend on his wage relative to his parents’ labor income and the amount of
the home good consumed in each possible situation.
Let wL3 be the young adult’s wage that makes him indi¤erent between staying or
leaving his parents’ house when he …nds a job and the spouse is unemployed. Let ´(h2)
be the threshold, given the spouse’s employment status, such that for any w3 below that
threshold, the parents transfer some market good to him. The analytical expression for
this threshold can be easily obtained from expression (7a). It can be shown that wL3 is
always above ´ (1), given Assumptions 1 and 2. This is equivalent to say that for any
w3 ¸ wL3 the young leaves and does not receive any transfer.
Lemma 1 Given the employment status and labor supplies of all family members, the
young adult’s decision of staying or leaving the parents’ house is the following:
(i) If w3h3 < ´ (h2) ; he stays, for all h2 2 f0; 1g :
(ii) If w3h3 ¸ ´ (h2) ; he leaves if the spouse is employed, or if she is unemployed and
w3 ¸ wL3 :
wL3 = (¯z)
¡1 ´(0); z ´
³
1+¯
¯
´ ¡
b
b+a
¢± ¡ 1:
Whenever the young’s labor income, w3h3; is lower than ´(h2); he would receive a
positive transfer of the market good if he decides to live on his own. This transfer
guarantees that his consumption of the market good is the same whether he leaves or
stays; but since the consumption of the home good living at his parents’ is always greater
than or equal to the amount consumed living on his own, he stays.if his labor income is
lower than ´(h2). This is always the case when the young adult is unemployed.
On the other hand, if w3h3 ¸ ´ (h2) ; the young adult does not receive any transfer of
the market good when he decides to live on his own, his consumption level of that good
is larger when he leaves. So, if the spouse is employed, he will leave because his home
good consumption will be the same in or out of his parents’ house. In contrast, if the
spouse is unemployed, the consumption of the home good will be larger at his parents’
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house and so he will leave if his wage is su¢ciently large to compensate him for the loss
in the consumption of that good, w3 ¸ wL3 :
An implication of Lemma 1 is that young adults demand a higher wage to leave the
parental house when the spouse is unemployed. This implies that, given the employment
status of the spouse, children whose mothers are not working demand a higher wage to
leave the parental house than those whose mothers are employed. This result is in line
with the …nding of Martínez-Granado and Ruiz-Castillo (1998).
3.2 The spouse’s labor supply
The spouse’s decision of accepting or rejecting a job hinges on the young decision of leaving
the parental house and so, it can depend on the young’s employment status. Under a
…xed workweek, accepting or rejecting a job o¤er means to supply either the entire unit of
labor in the market or to supply zero. The following three Lemmas provide the spouse’s
reservation wages under the three possible scenarios: the young adult stays, the young
adult, if employed, leaves and receives a positive transfer, and the young adult leaves and
receives no transfer. Let !i = wi=w1 denote the wage of individual i relative to the head’s
wage, i = 2; 3:
Lemma 2 Suppose we are in case (P ); that is, the young adult stays at his parents’
home. Then, the spouse’s reservation wage, r2 (h3;P ), depends on the young’s employment
status, h3, and satis…es r2(0;P ) < r2(1;P ): The spouse’s labor supply is the following:
(i) If !2 < r2 (0;P ) ; then h2 = 0 for all h3:
(ii) If r2 (0;P ) · !2 < r2 (1;P ) ; the spouse accepts a job if the young adult is unem-
ployed.
(iii) If r2 (1;P ) · !2; then h2 = 1 for all h3:
Where r2 (h3;P ) ´
h¡
b+a
b
¢± ¡ 1i (1 + !3h3) :
Lemma 3 Suppose we are incase (A; T ); that is, the young adult leaves and receives
a positive transfer. Then, the spouse’s reservation wage, r2 (h3;A; T ), depends on the
young’s employment status, h3, and satis…es r2(0;A; T ) < r2(1;A;T ): The spouse’s labor
supply is the following:
(i) If !2 < r2 (0;A;T ) ; then h2 = 0 for all h3:
(ii) If r2 (0;A; T ) · !2 < r2 (1;A; T ) ; the spouse accepts a job if the young adult is
unemployed.
(iii) If r2 (1;A; T ) · !2; then h2 = 1 for all h3:
Where r2 (h3;A; T ) ´
h¡
b+a
b
¢ ±
1+¯ ¡ 1
i
(1 + !3h3) :
Lemmas 2 and 3 imply that the spouse’s reservation wage when the young adult stays
or leaves with a positive transfer depends on the young’s employment status and that,
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given this empoyment status, the spouse’s reservation wage is larger when the young stays
at the parental house. This is so beacuse, in that case, the spouse’s utility of working
at home is larger. Nevertheless, the spouse’s reservation wage when the employed young
leaves with no transfer can be lower than her reservation wage when he stays. This result
follows from Lemma 4.
Lemma 4 Suppose we are in case (A); that is, the employed young leaves and receives no
transfer. Then, the spouse’s reservation wage does not depend on the young’s employment
status, r2 (A) ; and satis…es r2 (A) = r2(0;P ): The spouse’s labor supply is
(i) If !2 < r2 (0;P ) ; then h2 = 0 8h3:
(ii) If !2 ¸ r2 (0;P ) ; then h2 = 1 8h3
These Lemmas imply that mothers of young people that stay home demand a higher
market wage to participate in the labor market, so they are less likely to work. This result,
coupled with the previous one —children of mothers who do not work are more likely to
stay at their parents house— suggest that we may see two types of families: One in which
young people stay longer at their parents’, where the mother does not participate in the
labor market, and other in which the young individuals leave and their mothers are part
of the labor force. The …ndings of Cantó-Sánchez (1997), Cantó-Sánchez and Mercader
(1999) and Martínez-Granado and Ruiz-Castillo (1998) point in this direction.
3.3 Interaction between the young adult’s and the spouse’s de-
cisions
To conclude this section we have to analyze the interaction between the young adult’s
leaving decision and the spouse’s labor supply described above. The resulting equilibrium
outcomes correspond, respectively, to stages three and two of the model.
As already mentioned, it is not di¢cult to check that Assumptions 1 and 2 imply that
´(1) · wL3 : That is, the wage that makes the young adult indi¤erent about leaving when
the spouse is unemployed is such that, for any spouse’s employment status, at that wage,
he will not receive any transfer when leaving. Then, it follows from Lemma 1 that either
if w3 < ´(0) or if ´(0) · w3 < ´(1), the young adult will choose to stay regardless of
the spouse employment status (he will be indi¤erent about leaving when the spouse is
employed). On the other hand, if the young’s wage is such that ´(1) · w3 < wL3 , he
will leave if the spouse is employed, but he will stay otherwise. It is shown in Lemma
A1 in the Appendix that whenever ´(1) · w3; the relative spouse’s wage must satisfy
!2 < r2(1; P ). That is, the spouse only accepts an o¤er if she foresees that the employed
young leaves, provided that her relative wage satis…es !2 ¸ r2(0; P ): But the young stays
if she rejects a job o¤er or she receives none, and leaves (with no transfer) if she receives
a job o¤er and accepts it. It is easy to show that the spouse’s utility of not working when
the employed young stays at the parental house, V2(0; 1;P ); is greater than her utility of
accepting a job o¤er when the young lives alone, V2(1; 1;A); if w3 < wL3 and !2 < r2(1; P ).
Therefore, in case ´(1) · w3 < wL3 ; the spouse will reject a job o¤er (h2 = 0) and the
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young adult will stay at his parents’. It follows that whenever w3 < wL3 ; the young adult
will stay. Finally, if wL3 · w3; the young adult will choose to leave and will receive no
transfer since ´(1) · w3: Proposition 1 summarizes these results.
Proposition 1 In equilibrium, the employed young individual always stays at the parental
house if his wage satis…es w3 < wL3 : Otherwise, he leaves and receives no transfer.
The main implication of Proposition 1 is that the young’s decision of leaving, in
equilibrium, depends solely on the wage he receives in the market, and not on the spouse’s
employment status. Thus, this Proposition characterizes two di¤erent scenarios regarding
the search behavior of the members of the family.
4 Search e¤orts
In this section we analyze the …rst stage of the model where unemployed individuals engage
in searching activities, taking into account the two scenarios characterized in Proposition
1. In the …rst scenario, the young adult’s wage is such that, if he becomes employed, he
prefers to stay at his parents’ home. In the second one, the young’s wage is su¢ciently
high so he decides to leave and receives no transfer. Naturally, the young’s search e¤ort
will increase with the young’s market wage, but we know that these two scenarios will
also a¤ect the spouse’s labor supply since it hinges on the young’s decision of leaving.
We analyze each scenario in turn, and then we will undertake some comparative statics
between both of them.
Let µsj be the probability of …nding a job for agent j with search e¤ort sj ; and let 12s
2
j
be the utility cost of the search activity. Assume that the spouse and young adult search
simultaneously and so that each agent will determine his/her search e¤ort taking as given
the other’s e¤ort. Given the consumption allocations de…ned in expressions (5), (8), (9),
(10) and (11), the spouse and young adult will maximize, respectively, their expected
utilities conditioned on their employment status. If the young adult remains unemployed,
or becomes employed but his market wage is relatively low, he cannot be strictly better
o¤ by leaving his parents’ house and so, the optimal consumption allocations will be given
by (5) and (10). With probability µs3, if the young adult’s wage is relatively high, he will
leave his parents’ house and so, the optimal consumption allocations will be given by (8),
(10) and (11).
4.1 The employed young stays
We know that for the young to stay at his parents’ house it must happen that his wage
satis…es w3 < wL3 :We also know that, in that case, the spouse’s reservation wage depends
on the young’s employment status. Therefore, according to Lemma 2, we have two possible
cases where the spouse’s search intensity can be positive. In the …rst case, the spouse’s
wage lies between her reservation wage for h3 = 0 and her reservation wage for h3 = 1 :
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the spouse accepts a job o¤er if the young is unemployed, and rejects it if the young is
employed. In the second one, the spouse’s wage is greater than her reservation wage when
the young is employed and she will always accept a job o¤er.
4.1.1 The spouse only accepts an o¤er if the young is unemployed
According to Lemma 2, if the young adult stays at the parental house, the spouse will
only accept a job o¤er if the young adult remains unemployed whenever the spouse’s wage
satis…es the following inequality:
r2 (0;P ) · !2 < r2 (1;P ) : (18)
In that case, the young adult solves the following problem:
max
s32[0;1]
©
µ2s3s2V3(0; 1;P ) + µs3 (1¡ µs2)V3 (0; 1;P )
+ (1¡ µs3) µs2V3(1; 0;P ) + (1¡ µs3) (1¡ µs2)V3(0; 0;P )¡ 12s23
ª
:
Notice that with probability µ2s3s2 both young and spouse receive a job o¤er. Since the
young always accepts a job o¤er, it follows from (18) that the spouse remains unemployed
because she will reject any o¤er. So with probability µ2s3s2, the utility of the young is
V3(0; 1;P ): The young …nds a job and the spouse does not with probability µs3 (1¡ µs2).
In that case, the associated young’s utility from consumption is V3 (0; 1;P ) : The inter-
pretation of the rest of the cases follows in a similar way.
The young adult problem can be written in a more compact form as follows:
max
s32[0;1]
½
µs3X (0;P ) + (1¡ µs3) µs2Y (0;P ) + V3(0; 0; P )¡ 1
2
s23
¾
; (19)
where X (h2;P ) ´ V3 (h2; 1;P ) ¡ V3 (h2; 0;P ) stands for the young’s utility gain of be-
coming employed when the spouse spends h2 hours in the market and he stays at his
parents’ home, and Y (h3;P ) ´ V3 (1; h3;P )¡ V3 (0; h3;P ) stands for the young’s utility
gain from the spouse employment given that he spends h3 hours in the market and stays
at his parents’ home. Therefore, the young adult’s search decision rule will be given by:
S3 (s2) = min fµ [X(0;P )¡ µs2Y (0;P )] ; 1g : (20)
The problem solved by the spouse can be written in the same fashion and its solution is
the following searching function:
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S2 (s3) = min
©
µ (1 + ¯)Y (0;P )¡ µ2s3(1 + ¯)Y (0;P ); 1
ª
: (21)
If follows from (13) and the de…nition of Y (h3;P ) that, for any spouse’s wage satisfying
r2 (0; P ) · !2, Y (0;P ) is non negative and so that (20) and (21) are both non increasing.
4.1.2 The spouse always accepts a job o¤er
The spouse will always accept a job o¤er when the young stays at the parental house, re-
gardless of his employment situation, if the spouse’s wage satis…es the following inequality
(Lemma 2(iii))
!2 ¸ r2 (1;P ) : (22)
Proceeding as in the previous case, the optimal search functions for the young and the
spouse are given, respectively, by the functions:
S3 (s2) = min
©
µX(0;P )¡ µ2s2 [Y (0;P )¡ Y (1;P )] ; 1
ª
; (23)
S2 (s3) = min
©
µ(1 + ¯)Y (0;P )¡ µ2 (1 + ¯) s3 (Y (0;P )¡ Y (1;P )) ; 1
ª
: (24)
It is easy to check that Y (0;P ) ¡ Y (1;P ) is non negative for any spouse’s relative
wage satisfying (22) and so that in this case both S3 and S2 are also non increasing.
4.2 The employed young leaves and receives no transfer
According to Proposition 1, the young leaves and receives no transfer if his market wage
satis…es w3 ¸ wL3 : Lemma 4 tells us that, in this case, the spouse reservation wage does
not depend on the young’s employment status, and so that the spouse’s search e¤ort can
be positive whenever her market wage satis…es the following inequality:
!2 ¸ r2(0;P ): (25)
Under this condition, the spouse will always accept a job o¤er and so, we can write the
young adult’s search problem as follows:
max
s32[0;1]
½
µs3X (0;A) + (1¡ µs3) µs2Y (0;P )¡ 1
2
s23
¾
; (26)
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where X(h3;A) has the same interpretation as expression X(h3; P ) de…ned above but
referring to the case in which the employed young leaves. The solution to this problem
yields the following search decision function:
S3 (s2) = min
©
µX (0;A)¡ µ2s2Y (0;P ) ; 1
ª
: (27)
Similarly, the spouse’s searching rule must solve the following program:
max
s22[0;1]
f(1¡ µs3) [µs2Z (0;P ) + V2 (0; 0;P )]+ (28)
+µs3 [µs2Z (1;A) + V2 (0; 1;A)]¡ 1
2
s22
¾
;
where Z(0;P ) = V2 (1; 0;P ) ¡ V2 (0; 0;P ) and Z (1;A) = V2 (1; 1;A) ¡ V2 (0; 1;A) repre-
sent the spouse’s utility gain from being employed when the young is, respectively, un-
employed and staying, and employed and living alone. It is easy to check that Z(0;P ) =
(1 + ¯)Y (0;P ) and that Z (1;A) = Y (0;P ), so that the di¤erence Z (1;A) ¡ Z (0;P )
is given by ¯Y (0;P ) :and so that this di¤erence is non-negative This result allows us to
write the solution to program (28) as follows:
S2 (s3) = min fµ [1 + (1¡ µs3) ¯]Y (0;P ) ; 1g : (29)
Therefore, we can conclude that the search e¤orts of the young adult and the spouse
are strategic substitutes in the household setting presented in this model. The higher
(lower) the spouse’s search e¤ort, the lower (higher) the young adult’s search e¤ort. We
call this e¤ect (captured in each case by the slope of the reaction function) the “strategic”
e¤ect. The following Proposition states that this strategic e¤ect is lower the larger the
gender gap (the smaller the spouse’s wage relative the head’s wage). Moreover, since the
spouse’s search e¤ort is positively a¤ected by ¯, the strategic e¤ect implies that, in all
cases, the young’s equilibrium search e¤ort is inversely related to the altruism factor.
Proposition 2 Let (s¤2; s¤3) be an interior solution to the spouse and child’s searching
game for a given altruism intensity ¯ 2 (0; 1). Then: (i) The larger the gender gap
between the spouse and head’s wages, the weaker the strategic e¤ect between s2 and s3.
(ii) A marginal increase in the altruism parameter implies an interior solution (s¤02 ; s
¤0
3 )
such that s¤02 > s
¤
2 and s
¤0
3 < s
¤
3.
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5 A comparison of the two scenarios: the young adult
stays and the young adult leaves
In this model economy two types of families arise endogenously depending on the young’s
market wage. One in which the young adult stays at his parents’ home regardless of his
employment situation, and another in which he leaves as soon as he …nds a job. The
critical value of the young’s market wage that de…nes these two scenarios depends solely
on the head’s wage and not on the spouse’s wage (Proposition 1). This result follows from
the equilibrium interaction between the young’s decision of leaving and the spouse’s labor
supply, the latter depending on the former. The spouse’s reservation wage is greater when
the employed young stays at the parental house and hence, it can depend on the young’s
wage (Lemmas 1–4).
This behavior of the young adult seems to …t the evidence we have for Spain: The
average wage perceived by individuals aged 23-30 who stay with their parents is around
86% of the average wage perceived by those who live by themselves. In this section we
want to analyze how this di¤erent behavior of the young induced by the di¤erence in
the market wage a¤ects in turn his own search e¤ort and the search e¤ort of the spouse.
Thus, we follow Proposition 1 and de…ne two scenarios: (1) young people receive a wage
below wL3 and (2) young people receive a wage greater than or equal to w
L
3 . We will
refer to the …rst scenario as that of the “traditional” family and to the second one as that
of the “modern” family. Then, we infer di¤erences in unemployment rates between each
scenario, for each type of individual. For the comparison of these two scenarios we focus
the analysis on the case where the spouse’s wage satis…es (18). This implies that the
young’s and the spouse’s search functions in the “traditional” family are those given by
expressions (20) and (21), respectively,.And those in the “modern” family are determined
by expressions (27) and (29). The main results of comparing the equilibrium search e¤orts
between di¤erent scenarios are stated in Proposition 3 and illustrated in Figure 1.
Proposition 3 Let the spouses in the “modern” and “traditional” families receive the
same market wage, satisfying condition (18) Then, at an interior equilibrium:
(i) The strategic e¤ect of the young’s search e¤ort on the spouse’s is larger in the
“traditional” than in the modern “family”.
(ii) The search e¤ort of the young adult is greater in the “modern” than in the “tradi-
tional” family.
(iii) The spouse’s search e¤ort is greater in the “modern” than in the “traditional”
family if the young’s wage relative to the heads’ in each scenario, !M3 and !
T
3 ; respectively,
satisfy
1 + !T3 ¸
"µ
b
b+ a
¶±
¢ !
M
3 ¢ (1 + ¯)
(1 + !M3 ) ¢ ¯
#¯
:
Part (i) of Proposition 3 comes from direct observation of the spouse’s search function
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in each scenario. Notice that the spouse’ search e¤ort is more sensitive to changes in
the young’s search e¤ort in the “traditional” than in the “modern” family. The second
part follows trivially since the young’s search e¤ort increases with his market wage. The
third part of the Proposition is proved in the Appendix. The inequality stated imposes a
lower bound to !T3 with respect to !
M
3 : Graphically, this inequality implies that the ratio
between the intercept levels of the functions ST3 and S
M
3 with the vertical axis is not too
small.
This Proposition states that if the wage the young receives in the “modern” family is
larger than that prevailing in the “traditional” one, both the young adult and the spouse
in the ”modern” family will choose a higher search e¤ort. A larger young’s e¤ort is a
straightforward implication, but a higher spouse’s e¤ort is not. An increase in w3 has
two e¤ects of opposite sign on the spouse’s search e¤ort. On the one hand, it decreases
the spouse’s e¤ort, since the young’s and the spouse’s e¤ort are strategic substitutes. On
the other hand, since the employed young adult leaves, a higher young’s wage lowers the
spouse’s utility of working at home, which increases her search e¤ort. The lower bound
imposed on !T3 ensures that this negative strategic e¤ect is more than compensated by
the positive e¤ect on her utility of working in the market.
This section points out that the prevailing family structure in an economy may depend
on labor market conditions. Our model predicts that whenever young adults receive a low
wage (which we have identi…ed as w3 < wL3 ), employed young adults stay at their parents’
home, whereas the opposite occurs otherwise. Moreover, young adults who command a
low wage in the market will choose a low search e¤ort when unemployed. This behavior
a¤ects negatively the spouses’ search e¤ort, as we have already seen. If the probability of
…nding a job only depends on the individual e¤ort, these results imply that unemployment
rates of spouses’ and young adults should be higher when the young adults’ wage is low.
This implication matches the evidence we have for Spain. The model is also able to o¤er
predictions on how youth’s and spouse’s reservation wages and search e¤orts change with
head’s earnings: reservation wages increase with head’s earnings and consequently, search
e¤orts decrease. These implications are in line with the …ndings reported by Cebrián and
Jimeno (1998).
Notice that this result is obtained solely because of the existence of a household good.
If it did not exist or the spouse had productivity zero in the provision of g, the result would
not appear: a low young’s search e¤ort would always imply a higher search e¤ort of the
spouse. If we thought of fathers as spouses which zero productivity at home, the model
would imply that, given the employment status of the mother, the father’s search e¤ort
would be higher in “traditional” families than in “modern” families.9 Since in Spain there
are many more “traditional” than “modern” families, the model points that we should
see much lower unemployment rates in male heads than in female spouses and youths, as
it is the case in Spain.
9In the current model setup, assume that the head is unemployed and the spouse is employed. Assume
further that the head is not productive in the provision of the household good. Alternatively, assume that
the spouse is unemployed, that w2 is some non labor income, and that the spouse provides the amount
of household good b. In both cases if w3 < wL3 we would obtain a low youth’s search e¤ort and a high
head’s e¤ort. The opposite would occur if w3 ¸ wL3 :
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We have also seen that in the case where the employed young adult stays at home the
spouse’ reservation wage is higher than in the case where the employed young leaves the
parents’ home. Although it is out of the scope of this paper, this result has an implication
about spouses’ participation rates. Suppose that instead of a representative family we had
many heterogeneous families where individuals di¤ered in their level of human capital,
and that the market wages re‡ect these di¤erences in human capital. In that case we
would obtain that spouses’ participation rates would be lower in those families in which
employed young adults stay at their parents’ home. Since spouses tend to be women, by
extension this model would imply that the female participation rate would be lower in
those countries, as the Southern European countries, where employed young adults tend
to stay at their parents’ house.
6 Flexibility in the workweek length
In this section we analyze how the availability of a ‡exible workweek a¤ects the labor
supply of the spouse and how this, in turn, in‡uences the young adult’s decision of leaving.
By ‡exible workweek we mean that the individuals who have received a job o¤er, at the
stage two decide not only whether to accept it, but also the number of hours they want to
supply. The availability or not of part time jobs will not a¤ect the young’s labor supply
because he will always choose to work full time. Likewise, if the head of the family is
employed, it must be true that h1 = 1.10
As in the …xed workweek case, the spouse’s reservation wages will depend on the
labor status of the young adult when his market wage is below a certain threshold. But
now these reservation wages will be smaller than those in the …xed case, for any given
h3. Moreover, the optimal allocation of the spouse’s productive time between market
and home activities will imply that the young may decide to stay for wages at which he
preferred to leave under a …xed workweek. The wage that makes him indi¤erent about
leaving when the spouse is unemployed is obviously the same as in the …xed case, but
when the spouse is employed the wage that makes the young indi¤erent is higher under a
‡exible workweek regime that under a …xed workweek regime. This result follows because
the spouse o¤ers exactly the fraction of time that maximizes the young’s utility if he
stays. So, under a ‡exible workweek, wL3 depends on h2:
Let h2 (h3;P ) and h2 (h3;A) denote the spouse’s labor supplies when the young stays
at his parents’ and lives alone, respectively, given his employment status h3: The following
Lemmas characterize, respectively, the young adult’s decision of leaving and the spouse’s
labor supply conditioned on the young’s choice.
Lemma 5 Under a ‡exible workweek, given the employment status and labor supplies of
all family members, the young adult’s decision of staying or leaving the parents’ house will
be the following:
10This always be optimal if we assume that the head’s market wage is higher than the spouse’s market
wage.
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(i) If w3h3 < ´ (h2) ; he stays 8h2; h3 2 [0; 1] :
(ii) If w3h3 ¸ ´ (h2) ; he leaves if the spouse is employed and w3 ¸ wL3 (h2 (1;P )) or if
the she is unemployed and wL3 (0) · w3 < wL3 (h2 (1;P )) :
Where; wL3 (h2) = ´ (h2) =¯z; z ´
³
1+¯
¯
´³
b
b+a(1¡h2)
´±
¡ 1:
Notice that wL3 (0) < w
L
3 (h2 (1;P )) and so that, in contrast with the …xed case, we
have that the employed young will stay either if his wage is below wL3 (0) ; or if his wage lies
between wL3 (0) and w
L
3 (h2 (1;P )) and the employed spouse supplies exactly the amount
of labor that maximizes his utility of staying: As the next Lemma shows, this labor supply
is the spouse’s optimal allocation of time to market activities when the young is employed
and stays at his parents’ house, h2 (1;P ).
Lemma 6 (a) If the young stays at his parents’ house, under a ‡exible workweek, the
spouse’s labor supply is determined by the following rules:
(i) If !2 < r
f
2 (h3;P ) ; then h2 (h3;P ) = 0:
(ii) If !2 ¸ rf2 (h3;P ) ; then h2 (h3;P ) = min
n
b+a
a(1+±)
¡ ±a(1+!3h3)
!2
; 1
o
:
Where rf2 (h3;P ) =
±a
b+a
(1 + !3h3) is the spouse’s reservation wage:
(b) If the young leaves his parents’ house, under a ‡exible workweek, the spouse’s reserva-
tion wage, rf2 (h3;A) ; and labor supply, h2 (h3;A) are given, respectively, by r
f
2 (0;P ) and
h2 (0;P ) ; and so they do not depend on h3:
Corollary 1 Suppose that !2 ¸ rf2 (h3;P ) : Then, given h3, if w3 < wL3 (h2 (1;P )), the
spouse’s labor supply is given by h2 (h3;P ). Otherwise, it is given by h2 (0;P ) for all h3.
The interpretation of this Corollary when h3 = 0 is trivial since the unemployed young
will stay at his parents’ house and, in that case, the spouse’s labor supply is given by
h2 (0;P ). If the young has found a job, h3 = 1, the spouse (provided she has found a job
too) will supply h2 (1;P ) if he stays or h2 (0;P ) if he leaves. But if his wage is below that
level that makes him indi¤erent about leaving, wL3 , he will stay; otherwise, he will leave.
Next we focus on the equilibrium outcomes associated to the environments identi…ed
above as “modern” and “traditional” families. Namely, we identify the “modern” family
with those families where the young adults receive a market wage that satis…es w3 ¸
wL3 (0), and the “traditional” society as that in which the young adult receives a wage
w3 < w
L
3 (0).
In contrast with the …xed workweek regime, there is another threshold level below
which the employed young in the “modern” family will choose to stay when the spouse
is employed, wL3 (h2 (1;P )) : Considering young’s wages above that threshold level will
increase the search e¤ort of the young belonging to a “modern” family but does not change
the qualitative comparisons we want to stablish between both types of families. For that
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reason and to keep comparisons more straight between the …xed and ‡exible regimes, we
concentrate the analysis of the “modern” family on the interval
£
wL3 (0) ; w
L
3 (h2 (1;P ))
¢
:
Moreover, concerning the spouse’s relative wages, we maintain the analysis restricted to
the case de…ned by (18).
6.1 The young adult stays
Suppose that the spouse’s wage belongs to the interval
h
rf2 (0;P ) ; r
f
2 (1;P )
´
. That is, the
spouse will accept a job o¤er when it occurs if the young adult remains unemployed or
when he becomes employed and leaves the parents’ house; otherwise, she rejects it. Since
in this subsection we are focusing on equilibria where the young stays, it follows that
when the young …nds a job, the spouse will never accept an o¤er.
Following the same steps as in the …xed workweek regime, it is not di¢cult to see that
both the young’s and the spouse’s reaction functions have the same structure as before.
The only di¤erence is that they are now evaluated at h2 = h2 (0;P ) instead of h2 = 1
when we consider the young’s utility gain from the spouse’s employment:
SFT3 (s2) = min
©
µ
£
XT (0;P )¡ µs2Y F (0;P )
¤
; 1
ª
; (30)
SFT2 (s3) = min
©
µ (1¡ µs3) (1 + ¯)Y F (0;P ) ; 1
ª
: (31)
where F stands for ‡exible, T for “traditional”, and Y F (0;P ) is equal to V3
¡
hT2 (0;P ) ; 0;P
¢
¡ V3 (0; 0;P ). It follows that Y F (0;P ) ¸ Y (0;P ), with a strict inequality when the
spouse prefers to work part time. Therefore, introducing a ‡exible workweek increases
the search e¤ort of the spouse and decreases the search e¤ort of the young, everything else
being the same. Note that we only need the superscript T when we refer to the young’s
adult utility gain of becoming employed since Y and Y F do not depend on the young’s
wage.
6.2 The employed young adult can leave
Suppose that the spouse’s wage belongs to the interval
h
rf2 (0;P ) ; r
f
2 (1;P )
´
. That is, the
spouse will accept a job o¤er when it occurs if the young adult remains unemployed or
when he becomes employed and leaves the parents’ house, being the spouse’s labor supply
in either situation given by h2 (0;P ) ; otherwise, she rejects it. Since in this subsection
we are assuming that the young’s wage belongs to the interval
£
wL3 (0) ; w
L
3 (h2 (1;P ))
¢
, it
follows that he will stay only if h2 (1;P ) is positive. But since the spouse’s wage is smaller
than rf2 (1;P ), we have that h2 (1;P ) is zero. Therefore, under these assumptions, the
employed young always leaves and so the spouse supplies h2 (0;P ).
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In this case, the young’s and spouse’s reaction functions are given, respectively, by:
SFM3 (s2) = min
©
µXM (0;A)¡ µ2s2Y F (0;P ) ; 1
ª
; (32)
SFM2 (s3) = min
©
µ [1 + (1¡ µs3)¯]Y F (0;P ) ; 1
ª
; (33)
where M means that the function X (0;A) is evaluated at young’s wages in the interval£
wL3 (0) ; w
L
3 (h2 (1;P ))
¢
. For the same reason as before, introducing a ‡exible workweek
increases the search e¤ort of the spouse and decreases the search e¤ort of the young,
everything else being the same.
We have shown that introducing ‡exibility increases the search e¤ort of the spouse
and decreases that of the young in both scenarios, a “modern” and a “traditional” family.
In either case, as in the …xed workweek, a marginal increase of ¯ will have the same
consequences for equilibrium e¤orts, but now the positive in‡uence of altruism on the
spouse’s search e¤ort will be stronger and the negative in‡uence on the young’s search
e¤ort will be weaker. This is so because the spouse’s reaction function under a ‡exible
workweek becomes ‡atter in the (s2; s3) plane; that is, becomes more sensitive to changes
in s3. The following proposition summarizes these results.
Proposition 4 Introducing a ‡exible workweek increases the search e¤ort of the spouse
and decreases the search e¤ort of the young at an interior solution. Moreover, given
an interior solution, the positive e¤ect of a marginal increase in ¯ on the spouse’s search
e¤ort becomes stronger and the negative e¤ect on the young’s search e¤ort becomes weaker.
6.3 Comparing both scenarios
We have shown that introducing ‡exibility increases the spouse’s participation in the
labor market since, under this regime, she will be willing to work at lower wages. But
now the young has a lower incentive to look for a job, because the increase in family
income associated to the spouse’s employment becomes a more likely outcome. The
question is whether introducing ‡exibility may reduce the di¤erence in search e¤orts
between “modern” and “traditional” families. We will show that the di¤erence between
the equilibrium search e¤orts of the young increases with ‡exibility, whereas the response
of spouses in either type of family becomes smaller. The intuition is that the negative
e¤ect of ‡exibility on the young’s search e¤ort will be more severe when the young wages
are relatively low because, in that case, the probability of bene…ting from a family transfer
is also larger.
Proposition 5 Under conditions in Proposition 3, a ‡exible workweek increases the
di¤erence sM3 ¡ sT3 and decreases the di¤erence sM2 ¡ sT2 :
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7 Final comments
In this paper we have built a simple model economy in which the prevailing family struc-
ture arises endogenously as a response to labor market conditions. The key element that
drives this result is the presence of a home (non-market) good. We have shown that if
the employed young adults perceive their market wage to be very low, they stay at their
parents’ home, and they leave otherwise. In the former case their search e¤ort is lower
than in the second, and this has implications for the spouses’ search behavior. In case the
employed young stays at home, the spouse’s marginal utility of working at home increases
and so her search e¤ort decreases. In an economy where employment rates depend on the
individuals’ search e¤orts, other things being equal, this search behavior will imply high
unemploymnet rates for young adults that decide to live with their parents and for their
mothers. These results seem to match some of the evidence we have for Spain, where the
majority of young adults stay at the parental house and unemployment a¤ects mainly to
young adults and female spouses..
Several assumptions have been made that need some discussion. We have assumed
throughout the paper that the head of the household is employed. The model, therefore,
cannot capture the full interaction between the three members of the family but delivers
predictions on how youth’s and the spouse’s reservation wages change with the head’s
earnings and could be used to analyze the interaction between head’s and young adult’s
search e¤orts.
We have also assumed that head and spouse allocate consumption according to a
sharing rule that does not depend on employment status. A straight extension of the
model would be to allow for it. Our intuition is that the spouse’s reservation wages will
be a¤ected and, in fact, they will decrease, which implies that her search e¤ort will be
higher for any given level of the youth’s search e¤ort. Nevertheless, the employed youth’s
decision of leaving or staying does not depend on the sharing rule and will not change:
the young adult will stay if his wage is low enough and, in that case, the search e¤ort of
the unemployed young will also be low. There still will be two e¤ects of opposite sign on
the spouse’s search e¤ort: on the one hand a lower young’s e¤ort induces a higher e¤ort
in the spouse but, on the other hand, her marginal utility of working in the market will
fall. Thus, we believe the results of the paper will remain essentially unchanged.
Another assumption is that the model is abstracted away from leisure. Introducing
leisure decisions would not alter the main results of the paper. If individuals obtained
utility form leisure they would have higher reservation wages and lower search e¤orts
than in the current setting, but the type of interaction between the spouse and the youth
will still appear in this extended framework. Finally, we have used a simple form of
logarithmic preferences. This assumption has unable us to obtain closed solutions for the
young adult’s threshold wage and for the spouse’s reservation wages which, in turn, do
not depend on the parents’ sharing rule parameter. Allowing for more general preferences
will not a¤ect the qualitative results of the model.
Bentolila and Ichino (1999) …nd that unemployment imposes on German and British
households larger losses of consumption than on its Italian and Spaniard counterparts.
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They argue that the transfers activated by family ties are the main responsible for the
lower loss in Southern countries. The insurance mechanism activated by the family has two
consequences: It decreases the cost of setting public programs to subsidize unemployed
individuals but, on the other hand, it a¤ects the incentives the individuals have to look
for a job. Whether these incentives are positively or negatively a¤ected by family ties
will depend on the status of the individual within the family. To make a quantitative
assessment of the distortions that family ties create we need to model the household and
how all its members interact. This model is just a …rst step in this direction.
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Table 1: Young individuals living with their parents, by age group, as percentage of
age group totals.
Sex Men Women
Age group 20-24 25-29 20-24 25-29
Year 1986 1994 1986 1994 1986 1994 1986 1994
Spain 88.1 91.5 53.2 65.8 76.6 84.3 35.3 47.6
Italy 87.8 92.2 49.6 66.0 70.4 82.4 25.5 44.1
France 56.9 61.8 19.3 22.5 36.4 41.6 8.4 10.3
U. Kingdom 57.2 56.8 21.9 20.8 33.8 37.0 8.6 10.8
Source: Cantó-Sánchez and Mercader-Prats (1999).
Table 2: Youth unemployment rates by age group in 1994. Di¤erent EU countries.
Unemployment rate Young Total
Spain 45.0 24.10
Italy 32.1 11.30
France 29.5 12.60
U. Kingdom 14.7 9.3
Source: Eurostat (1996).
Table 3: Distribution of unemployed workers by family status, 1993. As percentage of
total unemployment.
Living in family % of unem.
Spouses Single parents Young Total in fam. with
Men Women Men Women and others 0 employed
Spain 20.40 19.60 0.20 1.60 56.20 98.10 36.90
Italy 11.70 17.50 0.60 1.80 65.30 97.00 31.90
France 24.20 33.50 0.60 4.70 25.30 88.30 34.50
U. Kingdom 32.50 16.10 1.10 4.40 28.20 82.20 41.10
Source: OECD Employment Outlook (1995).
Table 4: Distribution of individuals aged 18-35, by activity, and as percentage of totals.
Men Women
LIVING WITH THEIR PARENTS YES NO YES NO
Percent. of total 66.71 33.29 55.47 44.53
Working 45.73 82.88 31.51 33.13
Studying 25.20 1.40 36.57 4.56
Work. and stud. 4.11 7.45 5.55 3.79
Not work, not stud. 24.96 8.27 26.37 58.52
Source: Martínez-Granado and Ruiz-Castillo (1998).
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Table 5: Temporary jobs held by new school leavers aged 16 to 29 years one year after
leaving school. As percentage of all jobs held.
Men Women
Total Training Involuntary Total Training Involuntary
Spain 85.8 15.5 69.4 87.4 14.6 71.0
Italy 32.8 53.5 17.7 51.9 41.4 25.2
France 68.3 33.5 - 66.3 28.9 -
U. Kingdom 27.3 11.7 25.9 25.7 10.0 25.3
Source: Cantó-Sánchez and Mercader-Prats (1999).
Table 6: Mean of hourly wages for individuals aged 23-30 according to level of educa-
tion and whether they live with their parents or not.
Level of education attained Total
Primary ed. High school College
Independant 607.42 775.96 1036.19 809.62
Dependant 614.05 608.66 902.37 691.88
Dep. as % of Ind. 101.10 78.44 70.10 85.45
Source: Panel Europeo de Hogares (POGUE) 1993-1994.
Table 7: Unemployment rates by sex and by relationship to head of household
Men Women
Active U rate Active U rate
Head 6,119.50 9.38 806.70 17.52
Spouse 294.60 8.02 3,075.20 22.85
Children 3,034.80 27.52 2,202.30 39.07
Labor Force Survey, last quarter 1997.
Active popu lation in thousands
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Figure 1: “Modern” and “Traditional” families searcing efforts. The spouse
wage relative to the head’s wage is the same, ω2
M =ω2
T. The young adult’s wage
relative to the head’s wage are different, ω3
M > ω3
T.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. If h3 = 0 the young trivially stays. If h3 = 1, there are two
cases: (i) h2 = 1: For any w3 < ´(1) is easy to check that V3(1; 1; P ) = V3(1; 1; A; T ).
Thus, we assume he stays. For any w3 ¸ ´(1) the employed young living out of his
parents’ house does not receive any transfer, T = 0, and V3(1; 1; P ) · V3(1; 1; A). The
inequality holds strictly if w3 > ´(1). (ii) h2 = 0: Then for any w3 < ´(0) we have
that V3(1; 1; P ) > V3(1; 1; A; T ), so the young stays. If w3 ¸ ´(0) we have two cases. If
w3 2
£
´(0); wL3
¢
the young stays. We just have to compare V3(0; 1; P ) and V3(0; 1; A). By
de…nition of wL3 , for any w3 ¸ wL3 , the youth leaves without any transfer.
Proof of Lemma 2. The expression of the reservation wages come from direct com-
parison of V2(1; h3; P ) and V2(0; h3; P ), shown in expression (12).
Proof of Lemma 3. The expression of the reservation wages come from direct com-
parison of V2(1; h3; A; T ) and V2(0; h3; A; T ), shown in expression (14).
Proof of Lemma 4. The expression of the reservation wages come from direct com-
parison of V2(1; h3; A) and V2(0; h3; A), shown in expression (16).
Lemma A1: If ´ (1) · w3 < wL3 , then !2 < r2 (1; P ) : Proof: (1) ´ (1) =w1 =
¯ (1 + !2) ; w
L
3 =w1 = 1=
h³
1+¯
¯
´ ¡
b
b+a
¢± ¡ 1i ´ !L3 . (2) r2 (1; P ) = h¡ b+ab ¢± ¡ 1i (1 + !3).
(3) Suppose that !2 ¸ r2 (1; P ). Summing up 1 to each side of the inequality and taking
into account that 1 + !2 · !3=¯, it yields that !3 ¸ !L3 , which is false. Therefore,
!2 < r2 (1; P ) :
Proof of Lemma 5. If h3 = 0, then V3 (h2; 0;P ) ¸ V3 (h2; 0;A; T ) ; so the young
stays. If h3 = 1 : (i) If the young leaves, then T > 0 but V3 (h2; 1;P ) ¸ V3 (h2; 1;A; T )
for all h2 2 [0; 1] ; so he stays. (ii) If the young leaves, then T = 0 and h2 = h2 (1;A).
If the young stays, then h2 = h2 (1;P ). V3 (h2 (1;A) ; 1;A) ¸ V3 (h2 (1;P ) ; 1;P ) i¤ w3 ¸
wL3 (h2 (1;P )) since V3 (h2; 1;A) does not depend on h2. So he stays if w3 < w
L
3 (0), he
leaves if w3 ¸ wL3 (h2 (1;P )), and if wL3 (0) · w3 < wL3 (h2 (1;P )) ; he leaves if h2 = 0 or
he stays if h2 = h2 (1;P ) :
Proof of Lemma 6. (a) h2 (h3;P ) = argmaxVp (h2; h3;P ) subject to h2 2 [0; 1].
The result follows from (12) in the text. (b) h2 (h3;A) = argmaxVp (h2; h3;A) subject
to h2 2 [0; 1] : It follows from (16) that h2 (h3;A) = h2 (0;P ) since V3 (h2; h3;A) does not
depend on h3:
Proof of Corollary The results follow from Lemma 8 and Lemma 9, since the young
always stays when the spouse is employed if w3 < wL3 (h2 (1;P )). And he leaves otherwise.
Proposition A1. Under a …xed workweek, there always exits a unique interior
solution to the searching game. Proof: Let eS3 (s2) = S¡12 (s2) : (1) The young stays. Case
1: It follows from (20) and (21) that eS3 (0) > 1 and S3 (0) < 1 for reasonable values of
!3 (i.e.: w3=w1 · 9). Moreover, S3 (s2) = 0 at s2 > 1 since !2 < r2 (1;P ) at Case 1, andeS3 (s2) = 0 at s2 < 1 since !2 < 1: Therefore, eS3 (s2) cuts S3 (s2) at an interior solution.
Case 2: Taking into account that 1 > Y (0;P ) > Y (1;P ), the above results also apply to
equations (23) and (24), but now S3 (s2) = 0 at s2 > 1 because !2 + !3 > !2. (2) The
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employed young always leaves. From (27) and (29), the same as before applies, but now
S3 (s2) = 0 at s2 > 1 because !3 ¸ !L3 :
Proof of Proposition 1. It follows from Lemmas 1 to 4 and Lemma A1.
Proof of Proposition 2. (1) The young stays. (i) The strategic e¤ect of s2 on
S3 is given by S 03 (s2). If the gender gap between spouses wages is large (Case 1),
it follows from (20) that S 03 (s2)C1 = ¡µ2Y (0;P )C1; if this gender gap is relatively
small (Case 2), it follows from (23) that S 03 (s2)C2 = ¡µ2 [Y (0;P )¡ Y (1;P )]C2 : Let
¤ (!2) = jS 03 (s2)C1j ¡ jS03 (s2)C2j = µ2
h
log (1 + !2) + log
³
1+e!2=(1+!3)
1+e!2
´
+ ± log b
b+a
i
where
!2 2 [r2 (0;P ) ; r2 (1;P )) and e!2 2 [r2 (1;P ) ; 1) : Let !2 be such that ¤ (!2) = 0: Then,
log (1 + !2) > log (1 + r2 (1;P )) i¤
¡
b+a
b
¢±
< 1 + e!2
1+!3
, the last inequality is true by de…-
nition of e!2: It follows that !2 > r2 (1;P ) and so ¤ (!2) < 0 for !2 2 [r2 (0;P ) ; r2 (1;P )),
since ¤0 (!2) > 0 for all !2 > 0. Therefore, the strategic e¤ect (in absolute value)
is larger in Case 2 than in Case 1. The same result follows for S2 with respect to s3
since jS 02 (s3)C1j ¡ jS 02 (s3)C2j = µ2 (1 + ¯) ¤ (!2) : (ii) S2 (s3) shifts outwards and becomes
steeper in the (s2; s3) plane under a marginal increase of ¯, whereas S3 (s2) is not a¤ected,
both in Case 1 and Case 2. Hence, s¤2¶> s
¤
2 and s
¤
3¶< s
¤
3: The shift in S2 (s3) increases with
the strategic e¤ect. It follows that the e¤ect of ¯ will be stronger in Case 2 than in Case
1. (2) The employed young leaves. The reactions functions do not change as we increase
!2, and since Y (0;P ) is increasing in !2; the results follow.
Proof of Proposition 3. SM3 (s2) > S
T
3 (s2) 8s2 and both functions have the same
slope. SM2 (s3) > S
T
2 (s3) for all s3 > 0 and the former is steeper (in absolute value) in
the (s2; s3) plane. It follows that sM3 > s
T
3 . If S
M
3 (0) =S
T
3 (0) < (1 + ¯) =¯, then s
M
2 > s
T
2 .
This su¢cient condition is equivalent to¡
1 + !T3
¢ ¸ h¡ b
b+a
¢± ³ !M3
1+!M3
´³
1+¯
¯
´i¯
:
Proof of Proposition 4. (1) A marginal increase in ¯ does not a¤ect SFT3 (s2)
and shifts SFT2 (s3) outwards in the (s2; s3) plane, which becomes ‡atter. Therefore, s
FT
3
decreases and sFT2 increases with ¯. The shift in S
FT
2 (s3) is proportional to Y
F (0;P ) and
hence ‡exibility enhances the positive e¤ect of ¯ on s2. Since SFT2 (s3) is steeper (‡atter
in the (s2; s3) plane) than ST2 (s3) in the …xed workweek case, it follows that the negative
e¤ect of ¯ on sS3 is weaker in the ‡exible workweek case. (2) S
FM
3 (s2) shifts to the origin,
since X (0;A;P ) is decreasing in ¯; but its slope is not a¤ected. SFM2 (s3) becomes ‡atter
in the (s2; s3) plane as before, but now for very large values of s3, a marginal increase
in ¯ lowers s2: SFM2 (s3) ¶¯· SFM2 (s3)¯ for s3 ¸ 1=µ > 1: It follows that, in equilibrium,
sFM2 increases and s
FM
3 decreases with ¯: For the same reason as in (1) ‡exibility in the
workweek enhances the positive e¤ect of ¯ on s2: Likewise, the indirect (negative) e¤ect of
¯ on sFM3 is weaker than in the …xed workweek case, and the direct (also negative) e¤ect
that operates through X (0;A) is the same, so the overall e¤ect of ¯ on sFM3 is weaker
than in the …xed workweek case.
Proof of Proposition 5. Computing the interior solutions fpr the “modern” family
(equations (27) and (29)), and for the “traditional” family (equations (20) and (21)),
respectively, it is easy to see that sM3 ¡ sT3 = A + B; where the factor A is equal
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to µ3 (1 + ¯)Y 2
£
1=
¡
1¡ µ4 (1 + ¯)Y 2¢¡ 1= ¡1¡ µ4¯Y 2¢¤ and B = µXM= ¡1¡ µ4¯Y 2¢¡
µXT=
¡
1¡ µ4 (1 + ¯)Y 2¢ :
Introducing ‡exibility increases the value of Y , and both A and B are strictly increasing
in Y . Therefore, sFM3 ¡ sFT3 > sM3 ¡ sT3 : Then, it must be true that Y F :
¡
sFM2 ¡ sFT2
¢
<
Y:
¡
sM2 ¡ sT2
¢
and hence that sFM2 ¡ sFT2 < sM2 ¡ sT2 , since Y F > Y .
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